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ABSTRACT
We use a large dataset covering all registered plants in the manufacturing sector in India over the
period 1986 to 1995 to examine the effects of a 1992 income tax law change that eliminated the
double taxation of wages paid to partners in partnership firms. This tax law change provides a unique
opportunity to identify the effects of tax policy changes on firm behavior in a developing country
context. Since the change provided incentives for shifting income from wages to profits, it also has
important implications for certain measures of wage inequality. We find an immediate and pervasive
response by partnership firms to the tax law change, reflected in a significant shifting of income from
profits  to  managerial  wages.  Since  about  50  percent  of  registered  manufacturing  plants  are
incorporated in the form of partnerships (including most family-run businesses), income shifting by
these firms could have a significant impact on measured wage inequality. We find a sizeable jump
in the mean and median relative wage of skilled workers (which includes managers and partners)
following the tax law change in 1992. This sudden increase in measured wage inequality follows
major trade liberalization and deregulation reforms announced earlier (in July 1991). We find that
the income shifting induced by the tax law change explains almost all of the observed increase in
measured wage inequality following these reforms. This finding is robust to inclusion of controls for
a number of other potential sources of post-liberalization increases in wage inequality. Our results
show that firms respond strongly to tax incentives for income shifting, and highlight the need to
control for the potential effects of tax incentives in studies of wage inequality.
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In this paper, we investigate the eﬀects of changes in Indian tax law regarding partnerships
on income shifting and measured wage inequality using a survey dataset covering the entire
Indian manufacturing sector for the nine-year period from 1987 to 1995. The tax law change,
introduced in 1992, increased incentives for partners to pay themselves wages and salaries, instead
of taking income mainly as share of proﬁts. This tax law change provides a unique opportunity
to study two important issues: how ﬁrms modify their behavior in response to tax incentives, in
a developing country context, and how income shifting aﬀects measured wage inequality, which
could be relevant for a number of studies that study wage inequality using data similar to ours.
Tax policy is often used to modify ﬁrm behavior, especially in developing countries. However,
conclusions about the eﬀectiveness of tax policy instruments are often confounded by the ef-
fects of unrelated concurrent macro-economic changes or introduction of other reform measures
(see Epifani (2003) or Tybout (2001) for a discussion in the context of import tax liberaliza-
tions). Because the tax law change we study aﬀected only partnership ﬁrms, we are able to
use non-partnership ﬁrms as a control group, and identify the eﬀects of the tax law using a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy. This approach compares the behavior of partnership ﬁrms to
other establishments of similar size belonging to the same industry located in the same state.
Because macroeconomic shocks and other reforms are very likely to aﬀect all establishments in
the same size-industry-location group in a similar fashion, we are able to identify the eﬀects of
the tax law change separate from other confounding changes.
To document the direct eﬀects on the tax law change, we examine four measures that reﬂect
the extent of income shifting: (1) the fraction of non-salaried owners; (2) the proﬁts-to-sales
ratio; (3) the wages-to-sales ratio; and (4) the white-collar wages-to-proﬁts ratio. As a model
of the incentives caused by the tax system suggests, we ﬁnd that the fraction of non-salaried
owners falls sharply, and the white-collar wages-to- proﬁts ratio rises signiﬁcantly in 1992-93,
the ﬁrst year that the new tax laws took eﬀect. There is also a drop in the proﬁts-to-sales ratio,
and an increase in wages-to-sales ratio following the tax law change. These are diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences eﬀects on partnership ﬁrms, controlling for shocks to speciﬁc industries, locations
and size quartiles using state-industry-size-year eﬀects.
Because the tax law change caused a shift in income for partners from proﬁts to wages, it
had an impact on measured wage inequality. Partner wages get added to the observed total
white-collar wage bill in the data, which leads to an increase in the measured skill premium
(the ratio of the white-collar wage rate to the blue-collar wage rate1) and in the ratio of the
white-collar wage bill to total wages.
Coincidentally, the tax law changes were introduced just a few months after a sweeping trade
(and other market) liberalization announced in July 1991. This timing is critically important be-
cause the behavioral response to the tax law changes could impact an analysis of the eﬀect of the
trade liberalization. Indeed, the eﬀect of free-market policies and trade liberalization on inequal-
ity is a subject of an intense ongoing debate. A number of studies have documented an increase
in wage inequality (usually measured as skill premium) in developing countries following trade
1The white-collar wage rate is obtained by dividing the total wage bill by the number of white-collar employees. The
blue-collar wage rate is obtained similarly.
2expansion. While observed increases in the skill premium are puzzling from the point of view of
the simplest Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, a number of alternative theoretical explanations have
been proposed.2 As discussed in the survey by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004), potential causes for
increasing wage inequality following trade liberalization include Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects due to
reduction in tariﬀs for unskilled-intensive industries, foreign direct investment (FDI) generating
additional demand for skilled workers, skill-biased technological change, or quality upgrading by
ﬁrms within industries.
Note that none of these trade-liberalization related explanations for increases in wage inequal-
ity suggests that the eﬀect would depend on the form of organization of the ﬁrm. Thus, since the
tax law changes were applicable only to partnership ﬁrms, we are able to adopt a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences strategy to distinguish the eﬀect of the tax law change from these alternative causes
for increases in measured wage inequality.
Our examination of the trends over the 1987-1995 period reveals a sharp increase in the mean
and in various percentiles of the distribution of the log skill premium in 1993. We ﬁnd similar
eﬀects on the share of white-collar wages in the total wage bill. Examination of these trends
across diﬀerent forms of organization shows that the overall eﬀects were largely driven by changes
within partnership ﬁrms, suggesting that the tax law change was responsible for the observed
spikes in measured inequality. This is conﬁrmed by regression analyses that control speciﬁcally
for tariﬀ changes, export and import orientation, FDI liberalization, distance to the frontier, and
capital intensity. We ﬁnd that almost all (6.5 percent of the 7.3 percent mean increase in the log
skill premium) is driven by changes to partnership ﬁrms.3 Similarly, we ﬁnd that most of the
increase (3.55 percent out of 4.63 percent) in the overall mean white-collar share of the wage bill
is driven by changes within partnership ﬁrms. Both of these ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion
of various controls and industry-location-size year eﬀects.4 We conclude that the increase in the
measured skill premium and the white-collar share of the wage bill that occurred beginning in
1992 were driven primarily by income shifting by owners in partnership ﬁrms.
Our paper contributes to the literature on behavioral responses to tax distortions.5 The
general topic of income shifting has been studied intensively by public ﬁnance scholars, although
the empirical work relies heavily on United States data, and, to a lesser extent, European data.
Large literatures have studied the extent to which the use of corporate debt ﬁnance (which shifts
income from the corporate to personal tax base) responds to the tax advantages of doing so,
and on the shift of ﬁrms and taxable income between corporate and non-corporate status. This
study is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst such paper that documents income shifting in a developing
country context. Our ﬁnding of a strong and immediate response to the incentive to shift income
from proﬁts to wages is consistent with Slemrod’s (1990) classiﬁcation of income shifting in the
highest tier of a hierarchy of behavioral responses to tax policy changes. We ﬁnd that adoption
of the income shifting response was immediate and pervasive across both rural and urban areas
2See Kremer and Maskin (2003) or Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) for surveys of this literature.
3A very small part of the change seems to be caused by changes speciﬁc to import-oriented sectors. Also, in the individual
speciﬁcation, there seems to be a relative decrease in skill premium in industries further away from the frontier (consistent
with theory); however this eﬀect is not present in the full speciﬁcation.
4One other factor that appears important here is capital deepening coupled with an increase in the skill premium for capital
intensive ﬁrms in the post-1992 period (accounting for about 0.6 percent of the total change of 4.63 percent in white-collar
share of the wage bill).
5Gordon and Slemrod (2000) provides an overview of this literature.
3as well as young and old ﬁrms.
In the public ﬁnance literature, the question examined by Gordon and Slemrod (2000) is
closest to that of this paper. It investigates shifting of income between the corporate and personal
tax base, and presents evidence that a substantial amount of income shifting occurred in the
United States between the mid-1960s and the mid-1990s. This evidence is based on time-series
regression analyses which reveal that an increase in corporate tax rates relative to personal tax
rates resulted in an increase both in reported personal income and a drop in reported corporate
income. Gordon and Slemrod (2000) focus on one mechanism for shifting – changing the form of
compensation for executives and other workers, such as between wage compensation and greater
use of stock options. They argue that increased income shifting could help explain two well-noted
phenomena occurring in the United States over this period – increasing concentration of personal
income and the declining rate of corporate proﬁtability. Because personal income appears fully
on individual tax returns but corporate income appears only indirectly through dividend receipts
and realized capital gains, the observed shift of income to the personal base of high-income ﬁrm
owners will increase inequality as measured by income that shows up on individual tax returns.
In the Indian case we study here, a shift from partnership income to salaries should not aﬀect
total personal income that shows up on personal tax returns, and so inequality measures based
on personal income tax returns should be unaﬀected.
This paper also contributes to the literature examining changes in the eﬀect of trade liberal-
ization on wage inequality and highlights the need to check for changes in the tax environment
when studying changes in skill premia or skill intensity, especially when using manufacturing
survey data.6 Our results thus provide a cautionary tale for event studies of regulatory changes
in general, and studies of trade liberalization in particular. To be sure, this potential weakness
of before-after studies of trade liberalization has been pointed out before; for example, Tybout
(2001) and Epifani (2003) argued that trade liberalization is often accompanied by a number
of other macroeconomic and product market reform policies, and discussed the diﬃculty with
which such studies can separately identify the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of reforms.
Finally, our paper sheds some light on the eﬀect of liberalization on inequality in India. We
ﬁnd that, controlling for the spurious increase in measured wage inequality induced by tax law
changes, there was little increase in wage inequality following the trade liberalization. Thus,
the 1991 reforms do not appear to have signiﬁcantly worsened wage inequality in the registered
manufacturing sector, at least over the four-year period following the reforms covered by our data.
Because our study addresses measured wage inequality in the registered manufacturing sector
only, our results must be interpreted with considerable caution with regard to its implications
for overall inequality (see discussion in Section 7).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section (Section 2), we brieﬂy
describe the relevant tax law changes introduced in the Finance Act of 1992, and the trade
6A number of studies in diﬀerent countries have used manufacturing survey data to examine wage inequality and the skill
premium. Examples include Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) for the United States; Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Revenga
(1997), and Hanson and Harrison (1999) for Mexico; and Pavcnik (2003) for Chile. Household-survey-based studies of income
inequality would not be aﬀected by income shifting, unless they are aﬀected by relative misreporting of diﬀerent kinds of
income. Similarly, income inequality studies based on data on total taxable income (say from income tax sources) would not be
biased; however, such data at the individual level are typically conﬁdential. Income inequality analysis using publicly-available
aggregate tax return data should also not be biased by income shifting, but could be biased by improvements in tax collection
(Banerjee and Piketty 2005).
4and other reforms introduced beginning in July 1991. In Section 3, we present a brief model
capturing the implications of the tax reform for income shifting and measured wage inequality,
and then describe diﬀerent theories relating trade liberalization to increases in wage inequality.
We describe the data and deﬁne the key variables used in our study in Section 4. In Section 5,
we present empirical evidence on the direct income shifting consequences of the tax law change.
In Section 6, we present empirical analysis of the trends in wage inequality and the extent to
which these trends can be explained by alternative trade theories. Section 7 summarizes our
results, and concludes.
2 Tax and Trade Reforms in the Early 1990s
2.1 Alternative Business Forms and the Tax Reforms of 1992
2.1.1 Alternative Business Forms
The three major choices for organizing a business in India are:7 (1) individual proprietorships;
(2) partnerships, and (3) companies (“private or public limited companies”). The individual
proprietorship form is used by entrepreneurs who have sole ownership of the establishment. For
establishments with multiple owners/shareholders, the two available alternatives for organization
were options (2) and (3) above. In the pre-1992 period, the key beneﬁt from choosing the
“partnership” form versus a “private or public limited company” form was that the entity-level
tax rates were signiﬁcantly lower on partnerships (a top rate of 18 percent for partnerships versus
45 to 50 percent for companies – see Table 3). However, the key non-tax disadvantage of this
form of organization was that the liability for partners was not limited. After 1992, the diﬀerence
in the tax rate between companies and partnerships narrowed considerably.8
The distribution of manufacturing sector establishments across diﬀerent business forms for
the year 1991 (the midpoint in our data period) is summarized in Table 2. As is evident from
the table, the predominant form of business organization was the partnership form (50 percent),
followed by companies (25.8 percent) and individual proprietorships (17.4 percent). Other forms
include trusts, cooperatives and government departmental enterprises. In terms of total employ-
ment, companies constituted the biggest share (50.9 percent), followed by others (24.9 percent),9
partnerships (19.3 percent), and individual proprietorships (4.9 percent).
2.1.2 Tax Reforms of 1992
The main statute governing income taxes is the Income Tax Act (1961). Every year, the gov-
ernment (or speciﬁcally, the Minister of Finance), proposes a budget (technically the “Finance
Act”) in February/March, which announces tax rates applicable for the tax year beginning April
1 of that year. Thus, the Finance Act of 1992, would announce tax rates applicable for the
ﬁscal year 1992-93 (April 1, 1992 to March 31, 1993), deﬁned as 1993 in our dataset and all our
7See Chapter 3 of Ramani et al. (2004) for a detailed discussion of alternative business forms; most of the discussion there
is applicable to the period we study. One key change was the tax treatment of partnership proﬁts and salaries to partners.
This is discussed in the section below.
8See also the discussion in footnote 15. While there is a small trend towards the “corporate” form, there was no change in
our dataset in this trend around the 1992 tax law change.
9Employment within others is dominated by Government Departmental Enterprises.
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Immediately prior to 1992-93, key provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act (1961), along
with the rates announced in the Annual Finance Acts (or “Budgets”), implied the following tax
treatment of remuneration and proﬁts of partners in partnership ﬁrms:
• Proﬁts of the ﬁrm were taxed twice. First, the ﬁrm had to pay an entity-level tax on proﬁts
at the rate speciﬁed for registered (partnership) ﬁrms.11 Additionally, each partner’s share
of the after-entity-tax proﬁts was to be added to the personal income of the partners and
subject to tax at the rate speciﬁed for individuals of the applicable income level.
• Any payment of interest, salary, bonus, commission, or remuneration made by the ﬁrm to
any partner of the ﬁrm was not deductible from revenues in the determination of the ﬁrm’s
taxable proﬁts.
One eﬀect of these provisions was that there was a tax disincentive to paying salaries to
partners of the ﬁrms (regardless of whether they worked at the ﬁrm). Any salary (or other type
of remuneration) would be taxed three times – ﬁrst as proﬁt at the hands of the ﬁrm (since
salaries were not deductible), second as proﬁt from business in the hands of the partner, and
third as salary income in the hands of the partner.12
The double taxation of partnership proﬁts was introduced in the Finance Act of 1956, and
was critiqued as early as 1958 by the Law Commission in their 12th Report.13 However, the
double taxation provisions were retained in the tax code until 1992.14 As discussed in the tax
reform committee’s Interim Report (1991), the primary reason for introducing a separate tax
at the partnership entity level was the concern that partners would be able to manipulate their
tax liability by “including relatives and friends as partners, some of whom may merely be their
“benamidars,” or namelenders.15
In early 1992, reports submitted by a committee set up to review Indian tax laws (called the
Chelliah Committee, after its chairman Raja J. Chelliah) made a number of recommendations,
10Technically, the rates are stated in the Income Tax Department publications as applicable for the next “assessment year,”
to be applied to the “prior year.” Thus, tax rates announced in the Finance Act 1992 would be for the “assessment year”
1993-94, but would be applicable on income earned in 1992-93 (the “prior year” for the “assessment year” 1993-94). The
Finance Act would also often amend parts of the Income Tax Act. Procedures and rules are outlined in the Income Tax Rules,
1962, and are revised through amendments to these rules, and through circulars and notiﬁcations.
11There are separate provisions relating to unregistered ﬁrms. Since our dataset covers only registered establishments, we
will restrict attention to provisions for registered ﬁrms.
12 The tax treatment of remuneration paid to the partners is not speciﬁcally referred to in the Income Tax Act prior to
1992. The only reference to remuneration of partners is to specify that these payments are not deductible when calculating a
partnership ﬁrm’s taxable income (see section 40, Income Tax, 1991). After 1992, it is speciﬁcally stated in the Income Tax
Act that remuneration to a partner would be treated as “Proﬁts and Gains from Business or Profession” and added to the
partner’s total taxable income (to the extent that these were deductible in the calculation of the ﬁrm’s taxable income). In the
absence of these speciﬁc exceptions, in the pre-1992 period salaries paid to a partner (like any other employee’s salary) would
have to be added to his total income.
13The Law Commission was set up by the central government to recommend revision and updating of laws to serve the
changing needs of the country.
14The taxation of income at the partnership level is unusual, compared to the practice in the United States, where partnership
income is not taxed at the business entity level, while each partner’s share of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts is included in their taxable
income.
15This concern was especially signiﬁcant in India where tracking and collecting taxes at the individual “benamidar” partner
level would have been administratively quite diﬃcult (due to the lack of social security numbers or other tracking information).
Prior to 1992, even with entity level taxation, the partnership ﬁrms had incentives to use benamidars to reduce each partner’s
share of proﬁts. Note that the double taxation of proﬁts was not unusual relative to other business forms. Under the alternate
organization as a “company,” proﬁts paid out as dividends to shareholders were also subject to double taxation (ﬁrst as proﬁts
in the hands of the company, and then as income at the individual level). Since tax rates on proﬁts for partnerships were lower
than for companies (see Table 2), the net tax paid on proﬁts received by the owners was lower for Partnerships. Also, tax paid
by the partnership was deducted from the ﬁrm’s proﬁts before allocation in the hands of the partners.
6including the abolition of the partnership double taxation provision. Two key drawbacks of
the pre-reform tax provisions highlighted by the committee were (1) double taxation, and (2)
excessive administrative burdens stemming from rectifying partners’ tax assessments due to
changes in declared income of the ﬁrm. Accordingly the reforms were intended to make the tax
code “more equitable” and to reduce the administrative burden on the system. Following the
recommendations, a number of amendments to provisions in the Income Tax Act relating to
registered partnerships were introduced in the Finance Act of 1992. The key changes (applicable
for income earned in the period April 1, 1992, to March 31, 1993, and subsequently) were the
following:
• Partnerships were allowed to deduct remuneration paid to “working” partners, within spec-
iﬁed limits. As per the Income Tax Act, 1961, a “working partner” was deﬁned as an
“individual who is actively engaged in conducting the aﬀairs of the business or profession of
the ﬁrm of which he is a partner.” These payments had to be authorized by the partnership
deeds.16
• Proﬁts of partnerships would be taxed only once, at the rate speciﬁed for the partnership
ﬁrm. These proﬁts would then be exempt from any further tax. In particular, the partners’
share of post-entity-tax proﬁts would not be included in their taxable income.
• Remuneration paid to partners were to be added to their personal income but only up to
the limit that was deductible while calculating the ﬁrm’s taxable income (see appendix 1
for these speciﬁed limits). Thus, remuneration in excess of the speciﬁed limit, which was
not allowed to be deducted while calculating taxable proﬁts for the ﬁrm, would also only
be taxed once – in the hands of the partnership ﬁrm at the rate applicable to such ﬁrms.
Notably, the Finance Act also substantially raised the entity-level tax rate on partnerships, from
a range of 10 to 18 percent in 1992 to a ﬂat 40 percent beginning in 1993. The relevant tax rates
on individuals, partnerships, and other companies are provided in Table 3.
The net impact of the changes (speciﬁcally the provision allowing salaries to “working” part-
ners to be deducted while calculating taxable proﬁts, and the provision ruling out double taxa-
tion of non-deductible remuneration) was to remove the disincentives related to paying salaries
to partners. Starting in 1992-93, the tax rate on income up to INR 100,000 (about USD 3500)
was less than the tax rate on corporate income (see Table 3), so there was a positive tax incentive
to pay out some amount of salary to working partners.17 The tax rates on other business forms
did not change substantially at this time (and during the period of our study); the tax rate
on various income brackets for individuals, which also aﬀects single proprietorships, did decline
somewhat in 1992-93.18
16From Explanation (4) under sub-clause (v) of clause (b) of section 40 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and notiﬁcation S.O.
1986 issued August 26, 1993. An appendix with relevant extracts from the Income Tax Act 1961 is available on request from
the authors.
17Also, there was a standard deduction allowed on salary income (but not on income from business proﬁts), which could
have provided further incentives to pay out salaries to working partners.
18 Note that while the tax reform eliminated double taxation, this was done by retaining taxation on partnerships at the
entity level. Thus, the change did not provide any signiﬁcant additional incentives to hire “benamidar” partners. Interestingly,
the Interim Report (1991) had recommended that tax at the partnership entity level be eliminated, and each partner’s share of
entity proﬁts be taxed at the individual level. The committee recognized that this could provide incentives to use semi-ﬁctional
(“benamidar”) partners. With taxation only at the individual level, each partner’s share of the income could be reduced
by adding ”benamidar” partners, thus lowering tax liability for the true partners at the individual level. (While this could
potentially be oﬀset by taxes on the income of the “benamidar” partners, in practice it would be administratively complex to
7We model the impact of the tax provisions and the predicted behavioral response in Section
3.1.
2.2 Trade Liberalization and Other Economic Reforms of 1991
Signiﬁcant reforms were introduced in 1991 that transitioned India from a closed, socialist econ-
omy to a more open, free-market oriented system. The proximate cause for the reforms was
a severe balance of payments crisis in 1991. In June 1991 a new government came into power
following mid-term elections; this government obtained funding from the international ﬁnan-
cial institutions (the IMF, the World Bank, and The Asian Development Bank) and initiated a
structural adjustment program on the advice of these institutions.
The three major reforms impacting the manufacturing sector were the liberalization of indus-
trial, foreign investment, and trade policies regulations.19 The major industrial policy change
was the extensive liberalization of licensing requirements for establishing and expanding capac-
ity, a cornerstone of the pre-1991 industrial regulatory regime (which came to be called the
“licence raj”).20 A modest easing of licensing norms had been undertaken in the late 1980s,
and the industrial policy announced in 1991 extended de-licensing to almost all industries in the
manufacturing sector. Another key reform announced in July 1991 was the signiﬁcant relax-
ation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) regulations, especially for investments into designated
high priority industries (known as “Appendix I industries”). The third major reform was the
reduction in tariﬀ rates across the board over the early 1990s. The rates dropped from an (un-
weighted) average of about 85 percent in 1990 to about 60 percent in 1992. There was also a
devaluation of the rupee by about 41 percent during the calendar year 1991 (from about INR
18.4/USD to about INR 25.8/USD), which counteracted the eﬀect of the tariﬀ reductions on
import-competing industries, and gave a boost for exporting ﬁrms.
Other pro-market macroeconomic policies initiated in 1991 included moves to reduce the ﬁscal
deﬁcit, liberalization of technology and capital goods imports, devaluation of the local currency,
transition to a market determined exchange rate and liberalization of capital markets. Since
these reforms were pervasive and announced simultaneously, their eﬀects are diﬃcult to disen-
tangle from each other and from other macroeconomic shocks. We discuss diﬀerent theoretical
explanations for increases in wage inequality following trade liberalization in Section 3.2.
3 1992 Tax Law Changes, Trade Liberalization, and Wage
Inequality
3.1 A Model of Behavioral Responses to the 1992 Tax Reform
We consider a simple model that captures the key elements of the 1992 tax law and tax rate
changes and predicts the behavioral responses of the partnerships aﬀected by the tax law change.
track and collect taxes from such persons.) The Interim Report suggested that this issue be addressed using a separate act that
prohibited the use of “Benamidars” (the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988), instead of distorting the tax structure.
Since the implemented reforms retained entity level taxes, we do not expect to ﬁnd a big increase in the number of partners in
partnerships. This was conﬁrmed by our analysis of the white-collar share of employment in partnership ﬁrms: we found no
signiﬁcant increase in the white-collar share of employment relative to other ﬁrms within the same state-industry cells.
19For a more extensive discussion of these and other reforms initiated in 1991 and continued through the 1990s, see Acharya
(2002).
20For interesting anecdotal evidence on the signiﬁcance of these reforms, see DeLong (2001).
83.1.1 Model Setup
We begin by taking the choice of business form as exogenous. While this choice could be aﬀected
by tax regulations (see e.g., MacKie-Mason and Gordon, 1997), our focus here is mainly on
income shifting within ﬁrms.21 Assume that a partnership generates a surplus per partner of
S. The K identical partners need to choose an amount X to pay themselves as wages, while
the remaining S − X of the surplus becomes proﬁt that accrue to the partners. The optimal
value of X, denoted X∗, is chosen to maximize the after-tax income of the typical partner. In a
world without taxes on wages or proﬁts, the X choice would be trivial: the partners would be
indiﬀerent between paying themselves wages or receiving a share of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
3.1.2 Behavior in the Pre-92 and Post-1992 Tax Regimes
The tax system alters this indiﬀerence. To see this, note that the after-tax income per partner
in the pre-1992 regime was given by:
Π = S [1 − tf(P)][1 − ti(I)] − Xti(I) + G[1 − ti(I)], (1)
where ti(I) is the average tax rate on the partner’s individual taxable income, which is a function
of the level of the partner’s taxable income I; tf(P) is the average tax rate on the income of
partnerships, which is a function of the level of the partnership’s total income P(= KS); and G
is outside income for the typical partner. Here, the partner’s individual taxable income I equals









˜ S + X + G
, (2)
where tm(r) is the marginal individual tax rate when the income level is r. Since the marginal
tax rate increases with income (see Table 3 for details), the average tax rate increases with I
and X. Also, since the salary paid to each partner (X) is not deductible in the pre-1992 period,




that X∗ is zero.22 Thus in the pre-1992 regime, no salary should be paid to the partners.
In the post-1992 regime, wages paid to partners were deductible, as long as they were below a
speciﬁed fraction of total proﬁts (see Appendix 1 for the speciﬁed limits). Wages above this cap,
while not deductible in the calculation of the ﬁrm’s taxable income, were exempt from individual
income tax in the hands of the partner. Deﬁning µ as
X
S
, we simplify the prescribed limits as
one cap, speciﬁed as a fraction of the surplus(¯ µ). Thus, after-tax income received per partner in
21Another reason for abstracting from the choice of business organizational form is that we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant changes in
the distribution of business forms around the time of the tax law change. (Logit and probit models of the choice of the
partnership form of organization, not reported here but available from the authors, indicate that there was a downward trend
in the propensity to operate as a partnership, but suggest no break in the trend around or after the introduction of the tax law
change in 1992). This is consistent with the fact that the new law did not alter the total tax on partnership income signiﬁcantly,
just the form of taxation, and by doing so aﬀected the incentives to shift income but not the incentive to operate in one form
versus another.
22From Equations 1 and 2, after some algebra we get:
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= −tm(I) < 0.
9the post-1992 regime equals:
Π(X) = S − t′
f(P)(S − X) − t′













+ G[1 − t′
i(I)], (3)
where X ≤ ¯ µS, and t′
f(P) and t′
i(I) denote post-1992 average partnership and individual tax
rates at the partnership income level of P and the partner’s individual income level of I, respec-
tively. Because after 1992 the tax on partnership proﬁts was changed to a ﬂat rate (see Table
3), we have t′
f(P) = t′
f (constant, independent of P). Also, post-1992 partnership proﬁts were














m(r) is the post-1992 marginal tax rate at an income level of r. Therefore, we get:















f is a constant at 0.40 (see Table 2), and that t′
m increases in steps as the income
of the partner increases. Thus, as X goes up, so does the marginal individual income tax rate
t′
m.
Given these facts, equation 5 implies that so long as the marginal individual tax rate applicable
for the partner (t′
m) is below the tax rate applicable to the ﬁrm’s income (t′
f = 0.40), each
partner’s post-tax income is increasing in X. Equation 6 indicates that once X exceeds the
prescribed limit ¯ µS, the partners would be indiﬀerent about the choice of X. Thus, the optimal
choice would be to increase X∗ until the marginal tax rate applicable to the partner’s personal
income is just equal to the tax rate on the partnership ﬁrm.23 Thus the decision rule is:
X∗ : t′
m (X∗ + G) = t′
f. (7)
Based on this, we obtain the following predictions about post-1992 optimal behavior:
1. If G is small enough so that t′
m (G) < 0.40, then X∗ > 0. From Table 2, this means that for
1992-93, 1993-94, and 1994-95, all partners whose outside income is less than INR 100,000
(≃ USD 3500) would choose to pay themselves positive wages. Thus, for years 1992-93 to
1994-95, at equilibrium we would have X∗ + G ≥ INR 100,000, because at income levels
exceeding INR 100,000, the tax rate t′
m = 0.40 = t′
f.
2. Assuming at least some partners have G < INR 100,000, the number of salaried partners
post-1992 should be positive. If the designation of working partners is ﬂexible (not subject
to scrutiny or challenge by the tax authorities), we expect the number of partners receiving
wages to equal the number of partners for whom outside income < INR 100,000.
3. Assuming at least some partners have G < INR 100,000 (≃ USD 3500), declared proﬁt for
the partnership is less than S.
23This reasoning assumes that S > 0.
10These behavioral responses will lead to the following observations for partnerships:
1. Unpaid (non-salaried) owners (proprietors and family members) as a fraction of total white-
collar employment should go down. If the tax law change is understood and acted on
immediately by all ﬁrms, we should see a big downward adjustment in 1992-93, and little
change thereafter.
2. Declared proﬁts should go down after the tax law change (holding other factors constant),
as some proﬁts are shifted to wage income for the proprietors. Thus, proﬁts as a proportion
of sales should go down, and the total wage bill as a proportion of sales should go up after
the tax law change.
3. The ratio of white-collar wage bill (which includes wages to all white-collar employees,
including partners) to proﬁts should go up.
Because the tax law changes were relevant only for partnership ﬁrms, we expect the above
predictions to hold for this type of ﬁrm, and expect no similar changes for ﬁrms that have a
diﬀerent business form. This allows us to implement a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy by using
the time-series of non-partnership data to serve as a control for the partnership data.24
3.1.3 Eﬀects on Measured Wage Inequality of Predicted Response to the 1992 Tax
Law Change
Tax induced income shifting will aﬀect measured wage inequality. To see this, assume that both
the white-collar (Ww) and blue- collar wage (Wb) rate stays the same (W′
w = Ww,W′
b = Wb)
in the periods before and after the tax law change (i.e., we abstract from any factor that could
change blue and/or white- collar wage rates). The observed white-collar share of the wage bill




where M is the number of salaried white-collar (non-production) employees and N is the number
of blue-collar employees. In the post-1992 tax regime this becomes:
wshpost92 =
WwM + XK
WwM + WbN + XK
,
where XK is the total amount of partnership proﬁts shifted to white-collar wage and salary
income, and K is the number of newly paid partners. Clearly, wshpost92 > wshpre92.25 Thus, as
a result of the shifting of income from proﬁts to wages by working partners induced by the 1992
tax law change, we expect the white-collar share of wages to go up.
24One issue that could impact our analysis is the signiﬁcant administrative diﬃculties in taxing income at the individual
level in India. One way to model this would be to assume that the eﬀective marginal tax on individual income is γtm(I), where
γ ∈ [0,1] captures a range of outcomes between full compliance (γ = 1) and full tax evasion (γ = 0) on salary income. For all
values of γ > 0 our basic results above would hold: there would be no incentive to pay any wage to partners in the pre-1992
period, while there would be an incentive to pay wages in the post-1992 period. In fact with lower eﬀective taxation of salary
income, there would be stronger incentives to pay out wages to partners in the post-92 period because the optimal X∗ would
increase as γ decreases (since the optimal X∗ is given by t′
f = γt′
m(X∗ + G), and t′
m(X∗ + G) is increasing in X∗). With
complete tax evasion on salary income, γ = 0, in the pre-1992 period, partnerships would be indiﬀerent about X∗, while in
the post-1992 period, partnerships would have an incentive to pay out the maximum amount of allowable wage income (i.e.,
X∗ = ¯ µS).
25Since wshpost92 − wshpre92 =
WbNXK
(WwM + WbN + XK)(WwM + WbN)
> 0.
11Observed wage inequality measured as ratio of white-collar to blue-collar wage rate in the











where J is the number of partners who receive wages in the post-1992 period. In our data,
partners and family members who begin to receive wages after the 1992 tax law change would get
reclassiﬁed from being “unpaid proprietors or family members” to paid “white-collar workers”.





X > Ww. (8)
Thus, if the amount of diverted proﬁts per paid partner (X) is higher than the mean white-
collar wage rate paid by the ﬁrm, we would expect measured wage inequality to go up for
partnerships after the 1992 tax law changes.
To summarize, our model predicts the following for partnerships:
1. The white collar share of wages should rise following the 1992 tax law change.
2. Assuming that the diverted proﬁts per paid partner is higher than white-collar wage rate,
measured wage inequality (i.e., the skill premium) will go up. In our data, median wage per
white-collar employee was only about INR 15,000 (about INR 32,250 at the 90th percentile),
much lower than the measured proﬁt before tax per unpaid partner of about INR 37,000
(about INR 329,150 at the 90th percentile). Thus, the assumption that the amount of
transferred proﬁts per partner was greater than wage rate for white-collar employees is
likely to hold for most of the ﬁrms, and hence we expect mean wage inequality to increase
for partnerships.26, 27
Again, since the tax law changes were relevant only for partnerships, we expect the above
predictions to hold only for this type of ﬁrm, and we expect no such changes to be observed for
ﬁrms that have a diﬀerent business form.
3.2 Theories of Trade Liberalization and Inequality
A number of studies have documented an increase in wage inequality following trade liberalization
and the expansion of trade in many developing countries (see Kremer and Maskin, 2003, or
26Two factors reinforce this possibility. One, the ceiling on the optimal transfer (applicable for working partners with zero
outside income) is INR 100,000, which is much higher than even the 90th percentile of observed mean white-collar wage rates.
Two, proﬁts per “working partner” would be even higher than the proﬁts per partner calculated above, increasing the likelihood
that proﬁts transferred per working partner are greater than the observed white-collar wage rate.
27Another implication of the model is that the increase in white collar share of wages would be larger for smaller ﬁrms (or
more precisely ﬁrms with lower number of white collar employees), since the ratio of diverted proﬁts to white collar wage bill
is likely to be higher for these ﬁrms. We tested this implication and found strong support for it in the data.
12Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004, for an overview of this literature). We discuss brieﬂy the main
theoretical explanations for this link.
According to the simplest versions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, developing countries should
see a decrease in wage inequality following reforms. In this model developing countries do not
have a comparative advantage in skill-intensive sectors, which would face import competition
and which are protected prior to liberalization. Post-liberalization, according to the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem that links product prices to wages, prices relatively decrease in the skill-
intensive import sector, which in turn reduces the wages of skilled workers. However, evidence
suggests that unskill-intensive sectors are the ones that in fact receive the most protection.28
Thus, trade liberalization would lead to price drops in unskill-intensive sectors, leading to in-
creases in skill premium consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
An alternative argument for increasing wage inequality in developing countries following trade
liberalization and the relaxation of foreign direct investment (FDI) regulations was proposed by
Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 2003). They suggest that these reforms shift the production of
intermediate goods from developed to developing countries. These products are skill-intensive
from the point of view of developing countries (though relatively unskill-intensive from the point
of view of developed countries, and hence outsourced to poorer countries). Thus, FDI generates
demand for skilled workers. Another path through which FDI liberalization (coupled with reduc-
tion in tariﬀs and removal of other restrictions on import of capital) could aﬀect skill premium is
by increasing the use of capital; then if capital and skilled labor are complementary, this would
lead to increased demand for skilled labor and hence an increase in the skill premium (Cragg
and Epelbaum, 1996).
Another source of increases in skill premium could be skill-biased technological change, which
could be induced by trade liberalization in three possible ways. Wood (1995) and Thoenig and
Verdier (2003) suggest that intensiﬁed import competition leads to greater R&D or adoption of
technologies that would otherwise not have been adopted. These new technologies are generally
skill-intensive, so that such skill-biased technological change leads to increases in skill premium.
Acemoglu (2003) argues that tariﬀ reductions lead to reduction in prices and hence increased
imports of machinery, oﬃce equipment, and other capital goods that are complementary to
skilled labor. Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2003) suggest that ﬁrms and sectors
that are close to the technology frontier survive and thrive post-liberalization, but ﬁrms away
from the technology frontier may be unable to ﬁght external entry. These eﬀects could lead to
an overall increase in the skill premium, if the surviving domestic sector ﬁrms are close to the
frontier and have higher skill-intensities.
In Verhoogen (2004), exporting requires high quality, which requires high-skill intensity. Trade
liberalization oﬀers export opportunities and thus increases demand for skilled workers, which
leads to an increase in wage inequality.
28An earlier study (Sivadasan, 2005) shows that the largest tariﬀ drops in Indian manufacturing were indeed in labor/low-
skill intensive sectors. This somewhat anomalous protection of low-skill intensive sectors in developing countries has been
documented by others (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004).
134 Data and Deﬁnition of Key Variables
The primary data source for this study is the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), undertaken
by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO), a department in the Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation, Government of India. The ASI covers all industrial units, called
“factories”(equivalent to plants) registered under the Factories Act employing more than 10
persons (if the plant used electricity) or 20 persons (for plants not using electricity).29 The
ASI frame is classiﬁed into two sectors: the “census sector” and the “sample sector.” Factories
employing more than 100 workers constitute the census sector. Roughly one-third of the units
in the “sample sector” are enumerated every year (changed from a sampling rate of one-half
in 1987-88). Since unit-level data on electronic media have only recently become available to
researchers, the unit-level ASI data is only beginning to be exploited in empirical studies (e.g.,
Sivadasan, 2005).
Certain limitations of the ASI data have been highlighted in the literature. Pradhan and
Saluja (1998) conclude that the ASI provides “fairly reliable data” on organized manufacturing
activity, but “with a considerable time-lag.” Nagaraj (1999) highlights three other shortcomings
of the ASI data: (1) incomplete coverage of factories, (2) underreporting of workers in factories
covered, especially in small factories, and (3) underreporting of value added. He indicates that
the underreporting may have increased over time. The questions we address are fortunately
not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by these shortcomings in the data. The lag in reporting the data does
not aﬀect us as we are looking at historical data. The underreporting issues highlighted by
Nagaraj do not bias our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates, under the reasonable assumption
that the pattern of underreporting does not change diﬀerently across the liberalized versus the
non-liberalized groups, or across one type of ownership group versus other types of ownership
groups.
In addition to the ASI, we use various other sources of data on the Indian economy. We
obtain information on tax rates for corporations and individuals from various volumes of the
Statistical Abstract published annually by the Central Statistical Organization and from the
website of the Income Tax Department in Delhi.30 Information on the sectors liberalized for
FDI was obtained from the Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics issued by the Oﬃce
of the Economic Advisor, Ministry of Industry, Government of India. Data on tariﬀ rates were
obtained from the World Bank Trade and Production database. Other data sources used include
the annual Economic Surveys published by the Ministry of Finance, the Income Tax Act for
various years from the website of the Central Board of Direct Taxes31 and data from various
government websites. Information on partnerships and other legal entities were obtained from
various commentaries on the website www.laws4india.com, including chapter 3 of Ramani et al.
(2004).
29Manufacturing activity undertaken in the informal sector (households (own-account) and unregistered workshops) are not
covered by the ASI. Like other low-income countries, India had a large fraction of employment in the informal sector. According
to estimates in Subrahmanya (2003), the employment share of the formal manufacturing sector was about 21.6 percent in 1989-
90. Figures from the Economic Census of 1991 suggest total employment in the manufacturing sector of about 30 million,
which implies a share of the formal sector of about 27.5% (based on total employment in the ASI sector of about 8.2 million




14The ASI dataset and the data collected from other sources were collated and cross-indexed
using diﬀerent concordance tables. Indian data authorities use a National Industrial Classiﬁca-
tion (NIC) scheme that is close to the International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC)
scheme; we created a concordance between the NIC (1987 revision) and the ISIC (1997) by care-
fully comparing deﬁnitions of speciﬁc codes. The wholesale price index data is collated using
another product classiﬁcation scheme, and this was cross-indexed to the NIC (1987) revision by
comparing individual categories under both the classiﬁcation schemes. Many variables in the
ASI dataset had to be standardized for consistency across the years. A detailed data appendix
describing the ASI dataset and the various steps undertaken to clean the data is available on
request from the authors.
We obtained unit-level ASI data for the nine-year period from 1986-87 to 1994-95 from the
CSO. The data is reported on a ﬁnancial year basis (e.g., the 1986-87 year refers to the period
April 1, 1986 to March 31, 1987 – hereafter we refer to year 1986-87 as 1987 and so on.) There
are about 50,000 plants in every year, yielding about 450,000 plant-year observations for the full
dataset. For our analysis, we exclude extremely small plants (less than or equal to 5 employees),
as the data on these plants appear to be noisy.32
The deﬁnitions of key wage and employment variables are explained in Table 1. Key points to
note are that we have three broad categories of employees reported: (1) blue-collar/production
workers (blue), (2) paid white-collar workers (white paid), and (3) working proprietors and
unpaid family members (prop). We deﬁne the white-collar wage rate as the total white-collar
wage bill divided by the number of paid white-collar workers. The blue-collar wage rate is deﬁned
as total blue-collar wage bill divided by the number of blue-collar workers.
To analyze the eﬀect of the tax law changes of 1992, we examine four variables:
1. “Fraction of non-salaried owners” is deﬁned as “working proprietors and unpaid family
members” (prop) divided by the total white-collar employment (white paid + prop);
2. “Proﬁts-to-sales ratio” are the proﬁts before taxes (reported as “proﬁts” in the dataset)
divided by the “gross sales” (reported in the dataset);
3. “Wage-bill-to-sales ratio” is deﬁned as the ratio of the total wage bill to “gross sales”; and
4. “White-collar wages-to-proﬁts ratio” is deﬁned as the ratio of the white collar wage bill to
proﬁts before taxes.
The total wage bill is equal to the sum of the blue-collar wage bill (bwbill) and the white-
collar wage bill (wwbill).33 We deﬁne two related measures of wage inequality: (1) the skill
premium, which is deﬁned as the ratio of blue-collar wage rate to white-collar wage rate, and (2)
the white-collar share of the total wage bill.
The dataset is based on a survey of plants, while tax laws apply at the ﬁrm level. Because
there could be many ﬁrms that have multiple plants within them, this raises two measurement-
related issues. The ﬁrst issue is how proﬁt is calculated at the plant level. Plant-level proﬁts
32 This set of small plants constitutes about 3.75 percent of the manufacturing sector plants, but represents only 0.06 percent
of total output, 0.19 percent of employment and about 0.91 percent of total capital. While the sampling frame for the survey is
the register of plants that employ more than 10 employees, the actual dataset includes many ﬁrms with less than 10 employees.
This arises because many plants get registered even if they employ less than 10 people, even though they are required to register
only if they exceed the 10-person limit. Also once the plant is registered, it would continue to be in the sampling frame even
after the employment levels dropped below the 10-person threshold.
33Refer to Table 1 for deﬁnitions of the wage bill variables bwbill and wwbill.
15in our dataset are calculated based on subtracting from reported gross sales the materials costs,
total wage bill, interest expenses, total rent, and depreciation. This reported proﬁt could be a
noisy indicator of the ﬁrm-level taxable proﬁts for two reasons. First, for multi-plant ﬁrms, proﬁts
at the ﬁrm level would be an aggregate of plant-level proﬁts, and if the proﬁtability of diﬀerent
plants are not perfectly correlated, regressions using plant-level data could yield diﬀerent results
from using plant-level data. Secondly, for both multi- and single-plant ﬁrms, proﬁts reported here
are based on accounting numbers for sales, material expenses, and depreciation that could diﬀer
from the ﬁrm-level taxable proﬁts for various reasons (for example, depreciation rates under tax
laws diﬀering from those used under Indian accounting standards). We expect these measurement
issues to be stable over time, and have no reason to expect the resulting measurement error to
systematically upward bias our estimates of the tax law change.34
The second issue with using plant-level data is whether the estimates of income shifting
and measured wage inequality eﬀects predicted at the ﬁrm level would be biased (upwards or
downwards) when looking at plant-level data. Because the incentives to shift income from proﬁts
to wages should apply to all the establishments within the ﬁrm, we expect the shift to show up
in the plant-level data too. Again, we do not expect measurement errors from aggregation and
diﬀerences between tax and accounting data to systematically bias our results upward.35
5 Empirical Evidence on Direct Eﬀects of 1992 Tax Law
Change
Here we present results from examining the behavioral implications of the tax law change, on
four variables: (1) unpaid owners as fraction of white-collar employment; (2) proﬁts-to-sales
ratio, (3) total wage-bill-to-sales ratio, and (4) the white-collar wage-bill-to-proﬁts ratio.
5.1 Trends
In ﬁgure 1, we present trends in the ratio of unpaid owners to white-collar employment for
diﬀerent types of business forms. As predicted by the model, the ratio of unpaid owners to
white-collar employees falls sharply for partnerships after 1992. Signiﬁcantly, there are no such
eﬀects for other categories of ﬁrms. Also note that unpaid owners are a much larger fraction
of white-collar employment in sole proprietorships and partnerships compared to other business
forms, as may be expected due to their generally smaller size.
Figure 2a shows the trends in the ratio of proﬁts-to-sales for partnerships. The ratio of
proﬁts-to-sales goes down in 1993 for partnerships. In ﬁgure 2b, we ﬁnd that the ratio of total
wages-to-sales goes up for partnerships following the tax law change. In ﬁgure 3, we see that the
ratio of white-collar wage-to-proﬁts goes up signiﬁcantly beginning in 1993.
All of these results are consistent with our model’s predictions about the impact of the tax
law change that allowed wage payments to partners to be deducted from the partnership ﬁrm’s
34In fact classical measurement error in the variables could bias our estimates downward. The problem of aggregation may
be less severe for partnership ﬁrms, as they are generally smaller and hence more likely to be single-plant ﬁrms.
35For multi-establishment ﬁrms where diﬀerent establishments belong to diﬀerent industries, the industry classiﬁcation of
the headquarters ﬁrm may be imprecise. Parameters identiﬁed by looking at diﬀerences across industries could be biased by
this misclassiﬁcation. We do not expect this measurement error to systematically bias our results, as our primary results are
based on diﬀerences within industries (i.e., we include industry-location ﬁxed eﬀects).
16taxable income beginning in 1993, prompting partners to begin paying themselves wages. This
moves some amounts from proﬁts to the white-collar wage bill in our data. This shifting of
income from proﬁts to partners’ wage payments results in the changes observed in ﬁgures 1, 2a,
2b, and 3.
Note that in all our ﬁgures we examine trends in medians rather than means because the
mean value of these variables are skewed; since all of them are ratios, true or measurement error
that causes denominators close to zero give rise to extreme outliers which severely skew the
mean.
In the next section, we examine regression speciﬁcations that allow us to examine the size
and statistical signiﬁcance of the eﬀects observed in these ﬁgures controlling for diﬀerent factors.
5.2 Regression Results
Table 4 presents the results of a series of multivariate regression analyses of the four indicators
of tax-induced income shifting. The speciﬁcations include various ﬁxed eﬀects, including year
eﬀects, to control for possible omitted variables. All dependent variables are winsorized by 2
percent on both ends of the distribution, to prevent outliers from skewing the mean eﬀects.
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we identify the eﬀect of the tax law change, as the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences eﬀect on partnerships of the tax change, captured as year dummies for 1993, 1994,
and 1995 (1987 is the omitted year in these speciﬁcations). Inclusion of year eﬀects implies that
the coeﬃcient on the interaction between the period dummy and the partnership dummy captures
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences eﬀect of the reform on partnerships relative to all non-partnership
businesses. We include state-industry-size dummy variables to control for unchanging location-
industry-size eﬀects.
In the second speciﬁcation for each of the four indicators, we control for common state-
industry-size-year shocks; thus, if the eﬀects in the ﬁrst regression are driven by peculiar shocks
in the post 1992 period to certain size categories (deﬁned using size quartile dummy variables)
of ﬁrms and/or locations and/or industries, which are correlated with the partnership dummy
(for example, if partnerships are disproportionately concentrated in some location or industry
which receives some external shock, or if smaller sized ﬁrms received a certain type of shock),
this speciﬁcation would control for those shocks.
We ﬁnd that, in both the speciﬁcations and for all four variables of interest, there is a large
and signiﬁcant diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences eﬀect of the Finance Act of 1992 on income shifting in
partnerships. We ﬁnd a 10 to 14 percent decline in fraction of non-salaried owners among
partnerships immediately following the tax law change, relative other ﬁrms in the same state-
industry cell. Similarly, we ﬁnd a 2.2 percent to 3.3 percent decline in the proﬁts-to-sales ratio.
The wage-bill-to-sales ratio goes up in the post-tax change period (by about 2.5 percent to 2.9
percent), while the ratio of the white-collar wage-bill-to-proﬁts goes up signiﬁcantly, by between
31 percent and 47 percent, in the post-reform period. All these eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level. These regressions thus conﬁrm the impression from the graphs that 1993 marks
a sharp divergence in behavior between partnerships and other businesses not aﬀected by the
Finance Act of 1992.
For the proﬁts-to-sales and the wages-to-sales ratios, there is some upward trend in the
17variables prior to the reform period. The relative eﬀects are the starkest for the fraction of un-
salaried owners and for the ratio of white-collar wage-bill-to-proﬁts. For the latter two variables,
there are no economically or statistically signiﬁcant changes in the years before the tax law
change; in contrast there are large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects in the years after the tax
law change. Because there are no large changes in the coeﬃcients between speciﬁcations 1 and
2, we can conclude that these estimates are not driven by state-industry time shocks coincident
with the tax law change. Finally, note that the pattern of the estimated coeﬃcients (especially
for the two variables where the tax law eﬀect is the strongest) suggests that the biggest change
occurred in the year 1993 (the year the tax law change came into force); this suggests that there
was relatively rapid learning about the implications of the law.36 37
6 Empirical Analysis of Wage Inequality Measures
6.1 Trends
Because the tax change of 1992 followed closely on the heels of the liberalization initiatives of
1991, the impact of the former on income shifting between proﬁts and white-collar wages could
aﬀect the analysis and conclusions about the implications of the latter. To begin to address this
issue, ﬁrst look at ﬁgure 4, which presents trends in diﬀerent percentiles of the distribution of
the log wage inequality (skill premium) over the years, and ﬁgure 5, which presents diﬀerent
percentiles of the white-collar share of the wage bill. Both ﬁgures are for the full sample of ﬁrms
in the dataset. As is evident from the graphs, both the skill premium and the white-collar share
of the wage bill show a signiﬁcant increase (across diﬀerent percentiles), but the sharp increase
begins in the year 1993 (which corresponds to ﬁscal year 1992-93), the ﬁrst year for which the
new tax provisions became eﬀective.
In ﬁgures 6 and 7, we examine the trends in the mean of the two wage inequality measures
for diﬀerent business forms. It is evident that there was a big increase in the mean log skill
premium for partnerships beginning in 1993. Strikingly, the magnitude of this jump is much
higher than the changes experienced by any other type of business. (There is some increase in
skill premium for public-limited companies, but the magnitude is much smaller than the jump
for partnerships.) Similarly, in ﬁgure 6, we ﬁnd a jump starting in 1993 in the white-collar share
of wages, which is again much more striking for partnerships.
36We also ran this analysis separately for rural and urban ﬁrms to test whether urban ﬁrms which may have better access to
tax specialists/accountants were quicker in responding to the law change. The results suggest a slightly faster response rate in
urban locations (the coeﬃcients in the urban-only regression are somewhat bigger than that for the full sample). Regarding the
fraction of non-salaried owners, the response of urban partnerships was quicker and larger than rural partnerships; similarly,
the eﬀects are stronger for urban partnerships with regard to the white-collar wage-bill-to-proﬁts ratio. The diﬀerences are
not stark for the other two variables (proﬁts-to-sales and wages-to-sales ratio). We conclude that learning about the tax law
change was quite rapid in both urban and rural locations.
37It may be possible that some establishments that paid above-average skill premia switched from the informal sector to
“registered partnerships” status in the formal sector around the time of the tax law change, driven by other macro-economic
changes in the economy. To test this, we also ran the analysis separately for old and young ﬁrms, where “old” is deﬁned as
establishments that were at least 10-years old, thus restricting the sample to establishments that entered well before the tax law
change was introduced. We ﬁnd some evidence of a slightly larger response by older partnerships with respect to the fraction of
unpaid owners and the white-collar wage-to-proﬁt ratio. The diﬀerences are less striking for the other two variables of interest,
with weak evidence for a slightly faster and larger response by older partnerships. These tests show that the eﬀects for the
full sample were not driven by diﬀerential responses from establishments that entered (or exited) after the tax law change was
introduced. This conclusion is supported by an analysis using a balanced panel data sub-sample, where we found signiﬁcant
responses to the tax law change by already existing partnership ﬁrms. Also, as discussed earlier, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant change
in the distribution of ownership forms. (There is a downward trend over the whole period in the fraction of ﬁrms that are
partnerships, but no change in this trend around the time of the tax reform.)
18These ﬁgures are consistent with the model predictions (assuming that the partnerships trans-
ferred surplus per partner greater than then pre-1993 average white-collar wage). Taken together
with the results in Section 5 above, these graphs suggest that partnerships shifted income from
proﬁts to wages, and that this change had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the observed overall average
trends in skill premium.
Note that the overall mean for the population is heavily aﬀected by the changes for part-
nerships. Since partnerships constitute 50 percent of the total number of ﬁrms (see Table 2),
the overall population mean is impacted equivalent to half the magnitude of the mean eﬀect on
partnerships. From Table 2, we can see that the impact of partnerships would be somewhat
reduced (but would still be signiﬁcant) if we look at employment-weighted aggregate means of
skill premiums and white-collar wage bill shares.
6.2 Regression Results: Baseline Speciﬁcations
Next, we investigate this issue more closely by performing a series of regression analyses of the
observed trends in log skill premium and skill intensity (white-collar share of wages). We regress
these measures on time dummies, controlling for state-industry-size ﬁxed eﬀects (i.e., we deﬁne
cells by state, industry, and size, and include dummies to capture ﬁxed eﬀects for each cell). We
also include interactions of the time dummies with a dummy for partnerships.
The results are presented in Table 5a. In columns 1 and 3 the independent variables are year
dummies; the omitted year is 1987. In columns 2 and 4, we summarize the trends using period
dummies – period 0 (which is omitted in the regressions) refers to years 1987, 1988, 1989, and
1990; period 1 refers to the transition period of 1991 and 1992, and period 2 refers to the period
after the tax law change (1993, 1994, and 1995).
In columns 1, 2, 3 and 4, we examine the log skill premium (ratio of white-collar to blue-collar
wage rates). We ﬁnd that almost all of the observed increase in the mean log skill premium can
be attributed to changes made by partnerships. All the year coeﬃcients after the 1992 tax law
change (1993, 1994, and 1995 year dummies) lose statistical and economic signiﬁcance, once we
control for changes made by partnerships. The year eﬀects are summarized in the regressions
with period dummies (column 2 and 4). We see that there was approximately a 7.6 percent
increase in the skill premium38 in the period after the tax law change. However, once we control
for actions taken by partnerships, this eﬀect completely disappears. Thus all of the post tax-
change increase in wage inequality could be attributed to changes made by partnerships. We
argue that for partnerships, these changes reﬂect the tax-induced income shifting rather than
liberalization-induced real eﬀects in skill premia.
In columns 5, 6, 7, and 8, we examine the white-collar share of labor (scaled by 100, so it is
expressed in percentage terms). We ﬁnd that there is an increase in the mean white-collar share
of wages of about 4.6 percentage points (coeﬃcient on dummy for period 2) following the tax
law change (from about 26.7 percent in the pre-1991 period to about 31.3 percent). We ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcient on period 2 drops to 1.08 percent after we control for changes in partnerships;
thus about 77 percent of the increase (3.55 percent out of 4.63 percent) in the mean white-collar
38Expressing changes in logged skill premium as percentage changes. This is only approximate, and is more exact for small
log point changes; the actual percentage change would be larger when the log point changes are large.
19share of wages can be attributed to changes made by partnerships, which reﬂect income shifting
due to the 1992 tax law change.
The results of regressing the log skill premium and the white- collar share of wages on year
dummies are summarized in ﬁgures 7 and 8 respectively. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, the big
jump in the mean skill premium and white-collar share of wages in 1993 disappears when we
control for the 1992 tax change (by conditioning out the actions of partnerships). Thus the big
jump in 1993 appears driven by the tax law change.
6.3 Regression Results: Robustness to Trade Liberalization-related
Causes
Because the jump in skill premium and white-collar share of labor is observed some months
after major reforms to trade and investment regulations were announced in July 1991, we should
consider a number of plausible alternative explanations for the observed trends, based on the
various theoretical explanations proposed for increases in skill premium following trade liberal-
ization discussed in Section 3.2.
In Section 6.2, to identify the eﬀects of the tax change, we attributed the behavior of partner-
ships (relative to other types of corporate entities) as being driven by the tax law change that
aﬀected only partnership ﬁrms. This diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy controls for the pervasive
eﬀect of the number of diﬀerent reforms introduced in 1991. To the extent that the market for
skilled labor is common across diﬀerent types of ﬁrms within and/or across industries, common
year eﬀects would control for the eﬀect of trade liberalization related causes of increases in skill
premium.
However, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identifying strategy could fail, if it was the case that
some other change was driving the behavior of a certain groups of ﬁrms (say in certain industries)
and partnerships happened to be concentrated among those ﬁrms (or those industries). For
example, the market for skilled labor may be segmented, so that the various trade-related causes
of increased demand for skilled labor aﬀects certain industries more than others, and partnerships
may be disproportionately concentrated in some of the most aﬀected industries. To control for
this, in Tables 5b and 5c, we include additional controls for dynamic eﬀects on speciﬁc industries
and/or ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst alternative story we examine is the reduction in tariﬀ rates.39 As discussed in
Section 3.2, Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects could drive the skill premium and share of white-collar
wages up in tariﬀ liberalized industries. There was a signiﬁcant reduction in tariﬀ rates in India
in 1991. So in column 3 of Table 5a and 5b, we include a variable that measures the drop in
tariﬀ between 1990 and 1992 at the 3-digit industry level (“Tariﬀ drop (1990-92)”), as well as
this variable interacted with period dummies. If the skill premium increased in the post-1991
period in industries where tariﬀs were reduced, then this tariﬀ drop variable interacted with the
post-1992 period dummy would pick up the eﬀect (and the coeﬃcient on the post-1992 dummy
would fall).
Next, we consider the trade orientation of the industry. We use two measures – export ori-
39As mentioned above, each of these alternative controls are required only if the markets for skilled labor are segmented, so
that increases in skill premia are concentrated in certain industries. Dissipated eﬀects are captured by the year eﬀects in Table
5a.
20entation, measured as the mean ratio of exports to output by industry for the pre-1991 period
(“Exports to output ratio (pre-91)”); and import orientation, measured as the mean ratio of
imports to output by industry for the pre-1991 period (“Imports to output ratio (pre-91)”). If
the Thoenig-Verdier (2003) or Wood (1995) type argument is true, we could expect the largest
increases in skill premium to be concentrated among import-competing industries. If the Ver-
hoogen (2004) explanation is true, we would expect the largest increases in skill premia in the
export-oriented sectors. Third, we consider liberalization of FDI, measured as a dummy vari-
able equal to one for industries that were opened to majority foreign direct investment in 1991
(“FDI deregulation dummy”). If the Feenstra-Hansen (1997, 2003) argument holds, we could
expect the strongest eﬀect in the industries for which FDI was liberalized. Fourth, we include
a control for the capital intensity – the log of the ratio of real capital to real value added for
each establishment (“Capital-output ratio”). If trade liberalization increases demand for capital
and if skill is complementary to capital, we should see increases in the skill-premium and white
collar share of wages driven by capital deepening. Finally, to address the explanation oﬀered
by Aghion et al. (2003), we include distance to the frontier, measured as the ratio of maximum
(over all 4-digit industries) industry mean log total factor productivity to the industry mean
total factor productivity (“Distance to frontier”).
Our results in Table 5b show that none of the trade-related explanations reduce the signiﬁ-
cance of the eﬀect of partnerships on log skill premium. Distance to the frontier is weakly sig-
niﬁcant by itself, but loses signiﬁcance when all other controls including the partnership dummy
are included.40 The inclusion of all the other controls has very little eﬀect on the partnership
dummy, and explains very little of the post-1992 jump in log skill premium. Similar results are
obtained for the white-collar share of wages in Table 5b. The one exception is that the capital
output ratio appears to be important, both by itself (column 7) and with other controls (column
9). Also, the combined regression (column 9) explains about half of the remaining increase in
white-collar share of wages in the post-1992 period (1.083 percent drops to 0.53 percent). This
suggests that, consistent with arguments made by Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) and Behrman,
Birdsall, and Szekely (2000), increases in capital intensity (as well as the increased skill premium
for capital intensive ﬁrms), play a signiﬁcant role in explaining the patterns in the white-collar
share of wages. Again, distance to the frontier is signiﬁcant by itself, but drops in signiﬁcance
once other controls are included. The coeﬃcient on partnership dummy drops very slightly in
the combined regression (column 9).
Overall we interpret our results as strong evidence that the observed increase in the measured
log skill premium and the white-collar share of wages were driven primarily by the income shifting
behavior of partnerships following the tax changes of 1992, even controlling for the eﬀects of
trade liberalization, trade orientation interacted with liberalization (through period dummies),
FDI liberalization, capital deepening, and distance to the frontier.
7 Conclusions
In 1992, India changed its income tax law in a way that provided partnerships incentives to shift
income from proﬁts to wages. We ﬁnd in the data that there was a strong response to these
40 This would be consistent with partnership ﬁrms being concentrated in industries further from the frontier, as deﬁned here.
21incentives. The fraction of non-salaried owners, proﬁts-to-sales ratio, the wage-to-sales ratio,
and the white-collar wage-to-proﬁts ratio, all change as predicted by economic theory. Crucially,
because the tax law change aﬀected only partnerships, we are able to identify the eﬀects of
the tax law change by comparing outcomes for partnerships relative to other business entities.
The data allow us to control for a variety of ﬁxed eﬀects, and also for industry-size-location
speciﬁc time-varying shocks that could aﬀect the variables of interest.41 Our results show that
ﬁrms respond strongly to tax incentives for income shifting in a developing country context,
suggesting that tax policy interventions can be eﬀective in modifying ﬁrm behavior.
The income shifting behavior has important implications for some widely-used measures of
wage inequality. This is especially important because the tax law change followed by just one
year a major trade and market liberalization that might by itself have caused shifts in the skill
premium, and thus wage inequality. We ﬁnd that, without controlling for the tax law change,
there is an increase in the mean skill premium of about 7.3 percentage points (signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level) in the post-1992 period compared to the pre-1991 period. Similarly, there is an
increase in the mean white-collar share of the wage bill of 4.6 percentage points (signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level). However, once we condition out the eﬀect of the taxes (by conditioning
out responses by partnership ﬁrms), we ﬁnd only a 0.8 percent point increase in the log skill
premium, and a 1.1 percent increase in the white-collar share of the wage bill. Our analysis thus
suggests that the major Indian trade and market liberalization measures announced in 1991 did
not have a large eﬀect on wage inequality in the Indian manufacturing sector, at least in the four
years following the liberalization.
One should exercise caution in applying these ﬁndings to the important question of how the
market reforms aﬀected overall income inequality and poverty in India. First, our study focuses
on the wage inequality and skill premium in the registered manufacturing sector only. We are
hesitant about generalizing these results to the entire economy, as the registered manufacturing
sector comprises a small part of the total economically active population.42 Also, note that
increasing wage inequality is not the same as increasing poverty; for example, an increase in the
wage rate for skilled labor could increase inequality without increasing poverty.43 Given the large
population of extremely poor people and the importance of poverty reduction as a policy goal,
41In our model and analysis, we examine the incentives for avoiding taxes by shifting of income from proﬁts to wages provided
by the 1992 tax law change. In addition to the legitimate shifting of income from proﬁts to wages, some ﬁrms may try to evade
entity-level taxes by underreporting sales. Our checks indicate that there was no signiﬁcant change in log gross sales around
the time of the 1992 tax reform for partnership ﬁrms relative to other ﬁrms within the same industry-state cells. (There is a
downward trend in the mean log gross sales for partnership ﬁrms but, unlike for the income shifting related variables, there is
no change in this trend around 1992-93.) Other ways to evade taxes may be to report additional employees, or reduce value
added by inﬂating material costs. We found no signiﬁcant change for partnerships in either total employment or log value
added. Thus we do not ﬁnd evidence for illegal tax evasion responses at the time of the tax change we are studying.
42Figures from the ILO (http://laborsta.ilo.org/) indicate a total economically active population (age 15 years and above) of
about 302 million in 1991. Our dataset covers about 8 million employees (see Table 2). The small proportion is not surprising
considering the large share of agriculture (about 65%, according to ILO ﬁgures) and the large share of informal manufacturing
(about 72 to 78% of employment in the manufacturing sector – see footnote 29).
43 Banerjee and Piketty (2005) examine inequality by looking at the share of total taxable income received by the top 1
percent of the taxpayers and ﬁnd an increase in such inequality in the 1990s. They ﬁnd a larger growth in wage compared
to non-wage income during the 1990s. Using their data, we ﬁnd a temporary increase in ratio of wage to non-wage income
around the time of the tax law change. While these results are not inconsistent with our ﬁndings, closer comparisons are
diﬃcult given the diﬀering nature of the two data sources. Trends in wage and overall inequality could diverge if there is rapid
growth in non-wage income due to outside factors (such as the rapid economic growth in the 1990s). In addition, trends in
the distribution of sources of taxable income could be aﬀected by changes in the quality of tax enforcement technology for
non-wage income relative to wage income (as discussed in Banerjee and Piketty, 2005, a number of innovations in tax collection
were introduced in the 1990s).
22an extensive literature has examined whether poverty reduction has accelerated or decelerated
after the reforms introduced in the early 1990s. This literature is intensely divided, with “no
consensus on what happened to Indian poverty in the 1990s” (Deaton and Kozel, 2005). Since
most of these studies are based on household expenditure surveys, they are unlikely to be aﬀected
by the measurement bias induced by tax-driven income-shifting observed in our manufacturing
plants survey dataset.
Our ﬁndings provide evidence for rapid and large responses by business entities and their
principals to income shifting incentives provided by tax law changes, and is one of the ﬁrst to
provide systematic evidence of this in a developing country context. As suggested by Slemrod
(1990), income shifting is particularly responsive to tax incentives. While this paper documents
an episode of substantial income shifting, it also demonstrates the danger of drawing welfare
conclusions based on estimated elasticities of a narrowly deﬁned tax base with respect to the tax
rate applied to that base. In this case, the elasticity of reported wages to the tax rate on wage
income overstates the eﬃciency cost, per dollar raised, of taxing wage income, because some of
the response represents a shift to (taxed) partnership income. Slemrod (1998) elaborates on this
issue.
The results discussed here also suggest that tax law changes could have important conse-
quences for studies of wage inequality that rely on data that could be polluted by tax-induced
income-shifting behavior, as have a number of studies of wage inequality that have used manu-
facturing sector survey datasets similar to ours. As demonstrated in our study, income shifting
from proﬁts to wages (or vice versa) could signiﬁcantly bias measured wage inequality in these
types of datasets.44
Finally, our study provides a cautionary tale with regard to event studies that use a before-
and-after approach to identify the eﬀect of government policy changes or other events. For
example, a number of studies, especially the early studies of trade liberalization, used the before-
and-after approach to identify the eﬀects of liberalization on productivity and wage inequality.45
Other tax or regulatory changes coincident with the event being studied could signiﬁcantly aﬀect
an accurate interpretation of the investigation, unless strategies are adopted to control for these
other changes.
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25Appendix 1: Restrictions on deductible remuneration to partners in the Finance
Act, 199246
The amount of remuneration paid to “working partners” that is deductible while calculating the
partnership ﬁrm’s taxable proﬁts is limited to:
(a) on the ﬁrst Rs. 75,000 of the book-proﬁt, or in
case of a loss
Rs. 50,000 or at the rate of 90 percent
of the book-proﬁt, whichever is more;
(b) on the next Rs. 75,000 of the book-proﬁt at the rate of 60 percent;
(c) on the balance of the book-proﬁt at the rate of 40 percent
46Extract from Section 40(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 1992.
26Table 1:  Definition of employment and wage variables (traced to primary variables in the data) 
(See data appendix for definitions of other variables.) 
Variable  Label  Definition  Source 
       
Employment variables 
totwrkrs  Workers (nos.)  Equivalent to blue-collar/ 
production workers 
In data 
totemp  All employees (nos.)   =totwrkrs + supervisory and 
managerial staff + other 
employees 
In data 
totpersons  Total persons engaged    =totemp + working proprietors 
+ unpaid family members 
In data 
blue  Number of blue-collar workers  =totwrks  Defined 
white  Number of white-collar workers  =totpers - totwrkr   Defined 
prop  Number of proprietors & family 
members 
=totpers – totemp  Defined 
white_paid  Paid white-collar employees  =white – prop1  Defined 
       
Wage variables 
wages  Wages to workers  =wages to blue-collar workers  In data 
salaries  Salaries to employees    =wages to blue-collar plus 
wages to white-collar 
In data 
bwage  Blue-collar wages  =wages  Defined 
wwage  White-collar wages  =salaries-wages  Defined 
bonuswrkrs  Bonus paid to workers    =bonus to blue  In data 
bonusemp  Bonus to employees   =bonus to blue + white  In data 
bbon  Blue-collar bonus  =bonuswrkrs  Defined 
wbon  White-collar bonus  =bonusemp-bonuswrkrs  Defined 
wemol  White-collar emol. (wages + bonuses)  =wwage+wbon  Defined 
bemol  Blue-collar emol. (wages + bonuses)  =bwage+bbon  Defined 
totben  Total value of benefits to all empl.  =contribution to PF + welfare 
expenses 
In data2 
wben  White-collar benefits  =totben*wemol/(wemol+bemol)   Defined 
bben   Blue-collar benefits  =totben*bemol/(wemol+bemol)   Defined 
bwbill  Total blue-collar wage bill  =wemol + wben  Defined 
wwbill  Total white-collar wage bill  =bemol + bben  Defined 
       
Wage rates, skill premium, and white-collar share of wage bill 
bwrate  Blue-collar wage rate  =bwbill/blue  Defined 
wwrate  White-collar wage rate  =wwbill/white_paid  Defined 
skprem  Skill premium  =wwrate/bwrate  Defined 
wshare  White-collar share of wage bill  = wwbill/(wwbill+bwbill)   Defined3 
log_skpr  Log (skill premium)  =log(skprem)  Defined 
log_wsh  Log(white-collar share of wage bill)  =log(wshare)  Defined 
1.  Assuming proprietors and family do not get paid any remuneration. 
2.  Subcomponents aggregated for 1987 and 1988. 
3.  Winsorized by 0.5 percent on both sides of the distribution to control for outliers. 
 
 Table 2:  Different types of business entities in the Indian manufacturing sector for a single 











         
Partnership: Joint family  6,962  7.6%  202,429   2.5% 
Partnership: Other  39,016  42.4%  1,383,364   16.8% 
Partnerships: Total  45,978  50.0%  1,585,793  19.3% 
         
Private-limited  company  16,035  17.4%  1,099,042   13.4% 
Public-limited  company  7,678  8.4%  3,091,401   37.6% 
Companies: Total   23,713  25.8%  4,190,443  50.9% 
         
Individual proprietorship  16,027  17.4%  404,726   4.9% 
         
Others  6,204  6.7%  2,044,163  24.9% 
         
Total  91,922  100.0%  8,225,124  100.0% 
 Table 3: Tax rates for different entities (1986-87 to 1994-95) 
Source:  Income tax Web sites, Statistical Abstract of India (various years) 



















Individuals                   
  0 to 18,000  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  18 to 22,000  25%  25%  25%  20%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  22 to 25,000  25%  25%  25%  20%  20%  20%  0%  0%  0% 
  25 to 28,000  30%  30%  30%  30%  20%  20%  0%  0%  0% 
  28 to 30,000  30%  30%  30%  30%  20%  20%  20%  0%  0% 
  30 to 35,000  30%  30%  30%  30%  30%  30%  20%  20%  0% 
  35 to 40,000  30%  30%  30%  30%  30%  30%  20%  20%  0% 
  40 to 50,000  30%  30%  30%  30%  30%  30%  20%  20%  20% 
  50 to 60,000  40%  40%  40%  40%  40%  40%  30%  30%  20% 
  60 to 100,000  40%  40%  40%  40%  40%  40%  30%  30%  30% 
  100 to 120,000  50%  50%  50%  50%  50%  50%  40%  40%  30% 
  120 to 150,000  50%  50%  50%  50%  50%  50%  40%  40%  40% 
  >150,000  50%  50%  50%  50%  50%  50%  40%  40%  40% 
                     
Partnership firms                    
  0 to 10,000  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  40%  40%  40% 
  10 to 15,000  5%  5%  5%  5%  0%  0%  40%  40%  40% 
  15 to 25,000  5%  5%  5%  5%  6%  6%  40%  40%  40% 
  25 to 50,000  7%  7%  7%  7%  6%  6%  40%  40%  40% 
  50 to 100,000  15%  15%  15%  15%  12%  12%  40%  40%  40% 
  >100,000  24%  24%  24%  24%  18%  18%  40%  40%  40% 
                     
Public-ltd cos (domestic)  50%  50%  50%  50%  40%  45%  45%  45%  40% 
Private-ltd cos (domestic)  55%  55%  55%  55%  45%  50%  50%  50%  40% 
                     
Cooperatives                   
  0 to 10,000  15%  15%  15%  15%  10%  10%  10%  10%  10% 
  10 to 20,000  25%  25%  25%  25%  20%  20%  20%  20%  20% 
  >20,000  40%  40%  40%  40%  35%  35%  35%  35%  35% 




  For the year 1989-90: 8 percent of income tax if total income exceeds Rs.50,000/-. 
￿
￿
  For the year 1991-92: 12 percent of income tax if taxable income exceeds Rs.75,000/-. 
￿
￿
  For the years 1992-93 and 1993-94: 12 percent of income tax if taxable income exceeds Rs. 1,00,000 
Individuals (residents only) 
￿
￿
  For the year 1989-90 : 8 percent of income tax if total income exceeds Rs.50,000/- 
￿
￿
  For the years 1990-91 and 1991-92: 12 percent of income tax if taxable income exceeds Rs.75,000/-  
￿
￿
  For the years 1992-93 and 1993-94: 12 percent of income tax if taxable income exceeds Rs.1,00,000/-  
￿
￿




  For the year 1989-90: 8 percent of income tax, if total income exceeds Rs50,000/- 
￿
￿




  For the year 1989-90: 8 percent of income tax if total income exceeds Rs.50,000/- 
￿
￿
  For the years 1990-91 and 1991-92: 12 percent of income tax if taxable income exceeds Rs.75,000/- 
￿
￿
  For the years 1992-93 and 1993-94: 12 percent of income tax if taxable income exceeds Rs.1,00,000/-  
￿
￿
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Individual proprietorships Partnership: joint family
Partnership: other Public limited companies
Private limited companies Others
Mean fraction of non-salaried owners
Figure 1: Proprietors and unpaid family members as a fraction of 
total white-collar employment  
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Partnership: joint family Partnership: other
Median profits-to-sales ratio: Partnerships
Figure 2b: Median total wage-bill-to-sales ratio for partnership 
firms
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Partnership: joint family Partnership: other
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Partnership: joint family Partnership: other
Median total wage-bill-to-sales ratio: PartnershipsTable 4:  Direct effect of the tax law change: Baseline regressions on full sample 
All dependent variables are winsorized by 2 percent on both ends of the distribution. D_partnership is a dummy equal to one for partnership firms. Standard errors are 
clustered at industry level.  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
  Fraction of Non-Salaried 
Owners 




  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
                        
D_partnership  0.155  0.148  0.054  0.054  -0.039  -0.04  -0.057  -0.019 
  [0.008]**  [0.008]**  [0.004]**  [0.005]**  [0.004]**  [0.005]**  [0.022]*  [0.025] 
(Year=1988)*D_partnership  -0.002  0.003  -0.001  -0.002  0  -0.002  0.034  0.03 
  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.035]  [0.039] 
(Year=1989)*D_partnership  0.001  -0.003  -0.006  -0.007  0  0.001  0.045  0.036 
  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.032]  [0.042] 
(Year=1990)*D_partnership  0  0.002  -0.013  -0.01  0.005  0.005  -0.017  -0.035 
  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.006]*  [0.006]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.031]  [0.038] 
(Year=1991)*D_partnership  0.006  0.007  -0.008  -0.007  0.009  0.01  -0.001  -0.019 
  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.005]+  [0.006]  [0.005]+  [0.007]  [0.030]  [0.041] 
(Year=1992)*D_partnership  0.004  0.008  -0.012  -0.012  0.014  0.02  -0.001  -0.027 
  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.005]*  [0.006]*  [0.004]**  [0.006]**  [0.031]  [0.035] 
(Year=1993)*D_partnership  -0.109  -0.095  -0.022  -0.023  0.025  0.028  0.38  0.311 
  [0.010]**  [0.008]**  [0.007]**  [0.007]**  [0.005]**  [0.007]**  [0.040]**  [0.044]** 
(Year=1994)*D_partnership  -0.143  -0.119  -0.033  -0.032  0.023  0.021  0.47  0.400 
  [0.008]**  [0.008]**  [0.005]**  [0.006]**  [0.004]**  [0.005]**  [0.040]**  [0.046]** 
(Year=1995)*D_partnership  -0.155  -0.131  -0.032  -0.035  0.029  0.030  0.465  0.381 
  [0.008]**  [0.008]**  [0.006]**  [0.006]**  [0.005]**  [0.005]**  [0.039]**  [0.042]** 
Constant  0.228  0.219  -0.045  -0.033  0.198  0.189  0.41  0.501 
  [0.004]**  [0.004]**  [0.004]**  [0.002]**  [0.003]**  [0.002]**  [0.021]**  [0.007]** 
                        
Year effects  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
State-ind-size effects  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
State-ind-size-year effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
                        
Observations  420200  420200  350102  350102  350024  350024  407515  407515 
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Percentile: p75
Log ratio of white to blue-collar wage  (skill premium)
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Percentile: p75
White-collar share of wage bill
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Individual proprietorships Partnership: joint family
Partnership: other Public limited companies
Private limited companies Others
Mean log ratio of white to blue-collar wage  (skill premium)
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Individual proprietorships Partnership: joint family
Partnership: other Public limited companies
Private limited companies Others
Mean white-collar share of wage bill
 
Figure 7: Mean white-collar share of wage bill by business type   Table 5a:  Skill premium trends – controlling for tax law change  
All regressions include state-industry-size fixed effects. log_skpr is log ratio of white-collar to blue-collar wage rate. wshare is 
white-collar share of the wage bill. D_partnership is a dummy equal to one for partnership firms. Standard errors are clustered at 
industry level.  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dependent variable  log_skpr  log_skpr  log_skpr  log_skpr  wshare  wshare  wshare  wshare 
Year=1988  -0.015    -0.015    0.179    0.324   
  [0.004]**    [0.007]*    [0.161]    [0.273]   
Year=1989  0.001    -0.008    0.189    0.156   
  [0.005]    [0.007]    [0.179]    [0.286]   
Year=1990  0.012    0.011    0.416    0.421   
  [0.006]*    [0.007]+    [0.194]*    [0.299]   
Year=1991  0.002    -0.002    0.665    0.566   
  [0.005]    [0.007]    [0.242]**    [0.345]   
Year=1992  -0.002    -0.015    1.073    0.735   
  [0.006]    [0.008]+    [0.214]**    [0.342]*   
Year=1993  0.063    -0.006    4.349    1.08   
  [0.007]**    [0.008]    [0.262]**    [0.336]**   
Year=1994  0.082    0.011    4.899    1.219   
  [0.009]**    [0.008]    [0.304]**    [0.381]**   
Year=1995  0.076    0.012    5.257    1.638   
  [0.007]**    [0.008]    [0.353]**    [0.448]**   
tpd=1 (1991,92)    -0.001    -0.007    0.663    0.417 
    [0.003]    [0.005]    [0.154]**    [0.201]* 
tpd=2 (1993,94,95)    0.073    0.008    4.63    1.083 
    [0.005]**    [0.005]    [0.239]**    [0.233]** 
D_partnership      -0.138  -0.138      -6.06  -6.334 
      [0.009]**  [0.007]**      [0.562]**  [0.471]** 
(Year=1988)*D_partnership      0        -0.342   
      [0.008]        [0.303]   
(Year=1989)*D_partnership      0.011        -0.232   
      [0.010]        [0.297]   
(Year=1990)*D_partnership      -0.009        -0.491   
      [0.010]        [0.337]   
(Year=1991)*D_partnership      -0.008        -0.432   
      [0.008]        [0.363]   
(Year=1992)*D_partnership      0.008        -0.132   
      [0.010]        [0.357]   
(Year=1993)*D_partnership      0.127        5.908   
      [0.011]**        [0.414]**   
(Year=1994)*D_partnership      0.13        6.784   
      [0.012]**        [0.472]**   
(Year=1995)*D_partnership      0.114        6.682   
      [0.011]**        [0.494]**   
(tpd=1)*D_partnership        0.001        -0.01 
        [0.006]        [0.214] 
(tpd=2)*D_partnership        0.123        6.724 
        [0.007]**        [0.339]** 
Constant  0.414  0.414  0.488  0.486  26.537  26.744  29.884  30.119 
  [0.005]**  [0.002]**  [0.007]**  [0.004]**  [0.176]**  [0.104]**  [0.372]**  [0.238]** 
Observations  385531  385531  385531  385531  421561  421561  421561  421561 

























1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
 
Log skill premium Log skill premium:  adjusted for partnerships
Log skill premium: Coefficients on year dummies
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Log skill premium Log skill premium:  adjusted for partnerships
White-collar share of wage bill: Coefficients on year dummies
 
Figure 9: Coefficient on year dummies on white-collar share of wage bill from Table 4 (with and without 
controls for partnership firms) Table 5b:  Log skill premium (ratio of white-collar to blue-collar wage rate) trends – alternative explanations 
All regressions include state-industry-size fixed effects. D_partnership is a dummy equal to one for partnership firms. Tariff drop (1990-92) is the drop in tariff between 
1990 and 1992 for 3-digit industries. Exports-to-output ratio and imports-to-output ratio are pre-91 averages for 3-digit industries.  FDI deregulation dummy is equal to 
one for industries where foreign investment up to 51 percent was permitted in 1991. Capital-output ratio is the log of the ratio of real capital to real value added. Distance 
to frontier is the ratio of maximum (over all 4-digit industries) industry mean log total factor productivity to the industry mean total factor productivity.  Standard errors 
are clustered at industry level. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
tpd=1 (1991,92)  -0.001  -0.007  -0.005  -0.002  -0.003  0.001  -0.002  -0.026  -0.029 
  [0.003]  [0.005]  [0.007]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.003]  [0.027]  [0.031] 
tpd=2 (1993,94,95)  0.073  0.008  0.086  0.075  0.074  0.074  0.068  0.148  0.011 
  [0.005]**  [0.005]  [0.009]**  [0.005]**  [0.006]**  [0.006]**  [0.005]**  [0.044]**  [0.047] 
D_partnership    -0.138              -0.143 
    [0.007]**              [0.006]** 
(tpd=1)*D_partnership    0.001              0.002 
    [0.006]              [0.006] 
(tpd=2)*D_partnership    0.123              0.121 
    [0.007]**              [0.007]** 
(tpd=1)*Tariff drop (1990-92)      0.012            0.013 
      [0.023]            [0.027] 
(tpd=2)*Tariff drop (1990-92)      -0.044            -0.036 
      [0.034]            [0.033] 
(tpd=1)*Exports-to-output ratio (pre-91)        -0.002          -0.003 
        [0.002]          [0.003] 
(tpd=2)*Exports-to-output ratio  (pre-91)        -0.006          -0.004 
        [0.006]          [0.005] 
(tpd=1)*Imports-to-output ratio (pre-91)          0.004        0.019 
          [0.015]        [0.017] 
(tpd=2)*Imports-to-output ratio (pre-91)          0.002        0.034 
          [0.014]        [0.012]** 
(tpd=1)*FDI deregulation dummy             -0.007      -0.009 
            [0.007]      [0.007] 
(tpd=2)*FDI deregulation dummy            -0.007      -0.006 
            [0.008]      [0.008] 
Capital-output ratio              0.008    0.009 
              [0.001]**    [0.001]** 
(tpd=1)* Capital-output ratio              -0.001    -0.001 
              [0.002]    [0.002] 
(tpd=2)* Capital-output ratio              0.001    -0.002 
              [0.002]    [0.002] 
(tpd=1)*Distance to frontier                0.035  0.022 
                [0.040]  [0.043] 
(tpd=2)*Distance to frontier                -0.109  0.006 
                [0.064]+  [0.064] 
Constant  0.414  0.486  0.421  0.421  0.421  0.422  0.417  0.407  0.498 
  [0.002]**  [0.004]**  [0.002]**  [0.002]**  [0.002]**  [0.002]**  [0.002]**  [0.002]**  [0.004]** 
Observations  385531  385531  354524  359722  359722  385531  325510  364722  300598 
R-squared  0.17  0.18  0.16  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.18  0.17  0.18 
 Table 5c:  White-collar share of wage bill trends – alternative explanations 
All regressions include state-industry-size fixed effects.  D_partnership is a dummy equal to one for partnership firms. Tariff drop (1990-92) is the drop in tariff between 
1990 and 1992 for 3-digit industries. Exports-to-output ratio and imports-to-output ratio are pre-91 averages for 3-digit industries.  FDI deregulation dummy is equal to 
one for industries where foreign investment up to 51 percent was permitted in 1991. Capital-output ratio is the log of the ratio of real capital to real value added. Distance 
to frontier is the ratio of maximum (over all 4-digit industries) industry mean log total factor productivity to the industry mean total factor productivity.  Standard errors 
are clustered at industry level. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
tpd=1 (1991,92)  0.663  0.417  0.25  0.608  0.531  0.599  0.46  -0.38  -1.229 
  [0.154]**  [0.201]*  [0.308]  [0.148]**  [0.159]**  [0.187]**  [0.156]**  [1.356]  [1.479] 
tpd=2 (1993,94,95)  4.63  1.083  4.474  4.73  4.526  4.492  4.039  10.221  0.55 
  [0.239]**  [0.233]**  [0.462]**  [0.228]**  [0.282]**  [0.310]**  [0.285]**  [2.621]**  [3.069] 
D_partnership    -6.334              -6.584 
    [0.471]**              [0.448]** 
(tpd=1)*D_partnership    -0.01              0.13 
    [0.214]              [0.204] 
(tpd=2)*D_partnership    6.724              6.467 
    [0.339]**              [0.361]** 
(tpd=1)*Tariff drop (1990-92)      1.285            1.367 
      [0.856]            [0.938] 
(tpd=2)*Tariff drop (1990-92)      0.715            2.513 
      [1.744]            [1.844] 
(tpd=1)*Exports-to-output ratio (pre-91)        -0.002          0.017 
        [0.038]          [0.046] 
(tpd=2)*Exports-to-output ratio  (pre-91)        -0.338          -0.164 
        [0.275]          [0.170] 
(tpd=1)*Imports-to-output ratio (pre-91)          0.701        0.122 
          [0.573]        [0.625] 
(tpd=2)*Imports-to-output ratio (pre-91)          1.345        1.386 
          [1.001]        [0.969] 
(tpd=1)*FDI deregulation dummy             0.247      0.459 
            [0.305]      [0.293] 
(tpd=2)*FDI deregulation dummy            0.526      0.976 
            [0.413]      [0.425]* 
Capital-output ratio              0.798    0.852 
              [0.084]**    [0.057]** 
(tpd=1)* Capital-output ratio              0.044    0.098 
              [0.062]    [0.063] 
(tpd=2)* Capital-output ratio              0.346    0.245 
              [0.062]**    [0.070]** 
(tpd=1)*Distance to frontier                1.464  1.063 
                [1.949]  [2.086] 
(tpd=2)*Distance to frontier                -8.075  -1.386 
                [3.752]*  [4.264] 
Constant  26.744  30.119  26.31  26.703  26.699  26.742  26.751  26.648  30.193 
  [0.104]**  [0.238]**  [0.102]**  [0.102]**  [0.102]**  [0.103]**  [0.129]**  [0.100]**  [0.199]** 
Observations  421561  421561  388270  394162  394162  421561  355710  399328  328979 
R-squared  0.33  0.34  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.36  0.33  0.36 
 Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 1a: Fraction of Partnership firms, and entry rates (1987-1995)1  






1987  55.5%  2.4%  1.1% 
1988  55.1%  2.7%  1.2% 
1989  52.6%  2.5%  1.1% 
1990  51.1%  2.5%  1.0% 
1991  50.0%  2.9%  1.1% 
1992  48.3%  2.6%  1.0% 
1993  47.0%  2.0%  0.6% 
1994  46.0%  2.6%  0.9% 
1995  44.7%  2.7%  0.9% 
 
Appendix Table 1b: Analysis of the choice of partnership organizational form (1987-1995)1  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Linear  Probit  Logit 
Log(Gross Sales)  -0.044  -0.128  -0.208 
  [0.004]**  [0.020]**  [0.032]** 
Log(Age of Plant: Winsorized by 0.5%)    0.077  0.126 
    [0.027]**  [0.044]** 
Trend (= Year - 1985)  -0.007  -0.019  -0.03 
  [0.001]**  [0.005]**  [0.008]** 
tpd=1 (1991,92)  0.003  -0.001  -0.003 
  [0.004]  [0.011]  [0.018] 
tpd=2 (1993,94,95)  0.003  -0.004  -0.007 
  [0.006]  [0.017]  [0.028] 
Constant  1.21  1.887  3.066 
  [0.063]**  [0.250]**  [0.406]** 
State-industry fixed effects  Yes  No  No 
Observations  350102  350103  350103 
R-squared  0.23     
                                                 
1 Appendix Tables 1a and 1b, and Figure 1 relate to footnote 22 in the text.  There is a downward trend in the fraction of partnerships in 
the sample.  There is no change in this trend around the time of the tax reform (1992).  Also there is no significant change around 1992 in 
the fraction of entrants that are partnerships. Table 1b indicates no significant change in the propensity to be incorporated as a partnership 
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Appendix Table 2: Regression estimates of the direct effects of the tax law change: Variation of response across age and location2  
 “Old” establishments are defined as those ``old" that are at least 10-years old.  Urban establishments are those located in areas coded as urban.  Other year dummies and 
year dummies interacted with the partnership dummy are omitted.  Standard errors are clustered at industry level.  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%. 
  Fraction of Non-Salaried 
Owners 
Profits-to-Sales Ratio  Wage-Bill-to-Sales Ratio  White-Collar Wage-Bill-to-
Profits Ratio 
  1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3 
















                         
(yr==1993)*D_partner  -0.097  -0.12  -0.102  -0.027  -0.022  -0.02  0.031  0.03  0.028  0.332  0.355  0.399 
  [0.016]**  [0.012]**  [0.026]**  [0.007]**  [0.007]**  [0.009]*  [0.006]**  [0.007]**  [0.008]**  [0.041]**  [0.048]**  [0.058]** 
(yr==1994)*D_partner  -0.133  -0.148  -0.15  -0.035  -0.03  -0.025  0.026  0.022  0.021  0.422  0.44  0.484 
  [0.008]**  [0.009]**  [0.011]**  [0.006]**  [0.006]**  [0.008]**  [0.005]**  [0.006]**  [0.008]**  [0.041]**  [0.048]**  [0.054]** 
(yr==1995)*D_partner  -0.148  -0.164  -0.161  -0.037  -0.032  -0.031  0.033  0.03  0.034  0.402  0.392  0.43 
  [0.008]**  [0.008]**  [0.011]**  [0.006]**  [0.006]**  [0.008]**  [0.005]**  [0.006]**  [0.006]**  [0.039]**  [0.046]**  [0.062]** 
Constant  0.2  0.2  0.198  -0.033  -0.024  -0.017  0.19  0.189  0.214  0.499  0.55  0.564 
  [0.006]**  [0.005]**  [0.007]**  [0.002]**  [0.002]**  [0.002]**  [0.002]**  [0.002]**  [0.002]**  [0.006]**  [0.008]**  [0.008]** 
                         
State-ind-year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                         
Observations  420200  296768  239979  350102  251318  198079  350024  251249  198008  407515  289757  230063 
R-squared  0.26  0.29  0.28  0.13  0.12  0.16  0.25  0.24  0.30  0.08  0.09  0.11 
Number of clusters  1097  1019  950  1045  977  908  1045  977  908  1088  1013  941 
                                                 
2 Appendix table 2 relates to footnote 37 and 38 in the text.  Refer text for a discussion of these results. Appendix 
 
Appendix Figure 2a:  Log sales of partnership firms (relative to others in the same state-
industry)3 
This figure plots the coefficient on year dummies interacted with a partnership dummy, in a regression where the 
dependent variable is Log (Gross Sales).   State-industry-year effects were included in this regression, so the 
coefficients can be interpreted as the change in Log (Gross Sales) for partnership firms relative to other firms within 
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Appendix Figure 2b:  Log employment and value added of partnership firms (relative to others 
in the same state-industry)3 
This figure plots the coefficients on year dummies interacted with a partnership dummy, from regressions where the 
dependent variables are Log (Total Employment) and Log(Value Added).   State-industry-year effects were included 
in this regression, so the coefficients can be interpreted as the change in the dependent variables for partnerships 
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3 Figures 2a and 2b relate to footnote 42.  We find no evidence of significant jumps in sales or 
total employment or value added, which would have accompanied certain types of tax 
avoidance measures.   